Earlier this year I had a conversation with Don Bergh that led to his kind invitation to write this chapter. A little background will help put that conversation and this chapter in context. I am not a strategic management scholar -my field of specialization is human resource management. HRM topics of interest to me required that I learn a number of research methods introduced to management literatures after I left graduate school in 1982, e.g., structural equation modeling (Russell, 1985) , meta-analysis (Russell, Settoon, McGrath, Blanton, Kidwell, Lohrke, Scifries, & Danforth, 1994) , hierarchical linear models (Russell, 2001) , bootstrapping (Russell & Dean, 2000) , and most recently item response theory. Collaboration with colleagues in other management sub-disciplines (e.g., strategic management, international management, MIS) came as a direct result of these interests. Most relevant to this chapter were meta-analyses of the strategic groups and cultural distance literatures (Ketchen, Combs, Russell, Shook, Dean, Runge, Lohrke, Naumann, Haptonstahl, Baker, Beckstein, Handler, Honig, & Lamoreaux, 1997; Tihanyi, Griffeth, & Russell, 2004) . I continue to peruse the strategic groups and cultural distance literatures as an ad hoc reviewer for a number of management journals due to my involvement with these meta-analyses.
As a result of having read a great deal of original primary research in the strategic management literature for these meta-analyses, I mentioned to Don that I had been surprised by the number of basic research methods problems I encountered. To be sure, meta-analyses I have collaborated on in all literatures revealed a small percentage of what I have come to call "whoops" errors, named after the typical response received when I asked original authors for clarification of some curious or incongruous statistic reported in their article (e.g., degrees of freedom that don"t add correctly, effect sizes reported in tables that differ from those reported in the text, and other "housekeeping" kinds of mistakes). A small number of truly scary methodological errors were also revealed in the process of meta-analyzing these literatures. For example, in the final stages of writing the last draft of Ketchen et al. (1997) after it had been accepted, a coauthor brought a doctoral dissertation to my attention that empirically examined strategic group evidence in a sample of over 100,000 "organizations." Only ~ 27,000 organizations contributed to the 40 effect sizes used in our meta-analysis. Inclusion of this one study would have overwhelmed the 40 effect sizes, changing virtually every conclusion drawn and drastically modifying the manuscript! In reading the dissertation I was stunned to find the author"s sample came from approximately 13 years of CRISP tapes in which he (for example) had counted General Motors" data for 1980 through 1992 as information on 13 different and independent organizations. This violated fundamental assumptions required of empirical procedures used to create "strategic groups" in this literature (and used by the dissertation author), making all "groups," inferential statistics calculated from these "groups," and conclusions drawn about these "groups" spurious in this dissertation -its results were not included in the Ketchen et al. (1997) The positive way to frame this dissertation is that, if it were ever submitted, it never made it through the referee process to be presented at a national conference or published in a scholarly journal. 2 Secondary research uses results from primary research as its data (e.g., meta-analysis). Primary research evaluates hypotheses and research questions by drawing inferences from investigations of actual samples of the phenomena.
enhance theory development and performance prediction. I am very aware of the fact that the concerns I raise below occur (unfortunately) in HRM and other more "micro" management arenas, though I would contend with meaningfully lower frequencies. Regardless, the concerns raised below must be addressed if management research of all genres is to make real contributions to theory development and practice.
The first concern focused on here stems from the inverse of a view widely attributed to Kurt Lewin, i.e., that there is nothing as useful as a good theory. While I strongly agree with this sentiment, I would go further in applied arenas (e.g., business administration) and argue the inverse is also true, i.e., that a theory is not very good unless it is useful. 3 This begs the question of what constitutes "usefulness" in management theory. Note, this is not the "rigor vs.
relevance" issue raised so often as of late (e.g., Gulati, 2007) . It is instead simply a focus on how to demonstrate relevance, or "usefulness," of the rigorous research being reported. Hence, I will focus on a simple misinterpretation that occurs with alarming frequency. Specifically, all too often authors report and interpret coefficients of determination (i.e., 2 − 1 2 2 , or their parallels in logit, probit, feasible generalized least squares, and other alternatives used when OLS assumptions are not met) as metrics of how "good" a theory or model is in its prediction of some criteria of interest. We have all seen authors conclude Model A is clearly better than Model B because it explains more variance in some criterion Y. I will demonstrate why this is not an appropriate metric with which to judge a model"s usefulness and discuss an alternative metric and its implications. In doing so, I will assume for purposes of this discussion that the only relevant metrics of usefulness or "value" are economic, i.e., involve dollars (e.g. sales, profit, EBITDA, etc.).
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The second concern is with the near universal use of unwarranted causal language in interpreting results from strategic management research. After touching on the classic "correlation is not causation" observation, I will suggest explicit ways and provide examples of how to conduct strong tests of hypothesized causal strategic relationships. These two concerns -2 as an inappropriate metric of a theory"s usefulness and unjustified causal inferences -are two major reasons why Academy of Management and Strategic Planning Society research presentations are not overly subscribed by CEO"s and Strategic Management V.P."s. We need to assess theory quality using standards relevant to actual business executives (not just statisticians) and have more substance behind our causal inferences. − 1 2 … = 0 will yield mathematically identical outcomes to tests of H 0 : 2 = 0 and H 0 :
− 1 2 … 2 = 0. Not surprisingly, I rarely see the BCG model cited in the scholarly management literature, and never see it cited by strategic management scholars. So, I will first demonstrate how the Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser (BCG) model was originally developed to show how personnel selection systems add value to firms, though it also characterizes how the dollar impact of any organizational intervention can be estimated, be it strategic, entrepreneurial, HRrelated, etc. I will then make some minor adjustments to show how the model can be applied to more macro, strategic research arenas as well as some of the more interesting implications that are seldom fully appreciated in the current management literature. I will conclude this section with an example of how the BCG model might be applied to a recent strategic management study published in a recent issue of the Academy of Management Journal. Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser. Brogden (1949) started with the following OLS regression model:
Three parameters estimated from sample data for simple OLS regression models are b 0 , b 1 , and the Pearson product moment correlation (r xy ). If we don"t know yet how well someone is going to perform on a job (which we can"t know before s/he is hired), then one estimate of how s/he might perform would be the $ value obtained from plugging the applicant"s personnel selection test score X 1 into Error! Reference source not found.. Ordinary least squares regression analyses give us the formula for the "best" fitting straight line (i.e., Error! Reference source not found.), where "best" means the formula for the straight line
that minimizes the sum of all squared prediction errors (
2 ) across people in the sample.
Let"s assume the dependent measure is already in dollar terms (e.g., store profit, sales volume, etc., when selecting retail store managers). Brogden (1949) derived his model by first standardizing the predictor variable X, i.e., he standardized applicants" personnel selection test scores to create . . . 
Where is the average standardized personnel test score for those applicants actually selected by the firm. When no selection system is used (i.e., if applicants had been chosen at random), is expected to be the same as the average of z scores for all applicants, or = 0. When = 0 then E(b 1 ) = 0 too, and the remainder -E(b 0 ) -will be the average dollar performance of individuals selected at random from the applicant pool. Using μ $ as the symbol for expected or average dollar performance for everyone in the applicant pool, we can substitute μ $ for E(b 0 ) in
Finally, the expected value of b 1 can be estimated directly from a sample obtained in a criterionrelated validity study, though it is often useful to substitute for E(b 1 ). Specifically, the sample regression coefficient or slope estimate is also defined as follows . . . . . . where $ is the average dollar value of the work accomplished by those selected. Of course, nothing is free, including personnel selection tests. Subtracting out the cost of testing (C) an applicant we get an even better estimate of total dollar value added per applicant selected of . . .
Making a final change to reflect the number of applicants selected (N s ) and tested (N a ) we get the total dollar value added from N s newcomers selected from N a applicants:
Note, Equation 3 toEquation 7 focus on the total dollar value added from work performance of those selected using some personnel selection system. They do not tell us how much of that performance was due to use of the personnel selection system. The portion of the total dollar value added by those selected due to the personnel selection system is usually called the utility of that selection system. The utility or dollar value added to the firm due to use of the personnel selection system by the N s individuals selected can be estimated by subtracting μ $ from both Equation 9 is often written as . . . . . . where ΔU is the change in utility in dollar terms expected due to use of the personnel selection system to select N s new hires from N a applicants (see Boudreau, 1991, for BCG model extensions that reflect average job tenure, depreciation, marginal tax rates, etc.).
In sum, Equation 10 tells us the net dollar impact a selection system has, while Equation 8 equals the gross or total expected dollar impact of selecting N s new hires from N a applicants. show that it is r xy (or − 1 2 … when multiple predictors are used) that is linearly related to actual dollar impact on the firm, not value added by personnel selected using some personnel selection system. Most HRM decision makers will not be interested in forecasted expected dollar performance $ for some individual applicant "i." Each "application" of the system is to some number of job applicants (N a ), and the value added to the firm comes from the performance realized from the entire subset of applicants selected by the selection system (N s ). Parallel application of the BCG model at strategic levels would occur in large corporations containing multiple strategic business units (SBUs), where a central authority would impose common strategic interventions on SBUs. Just as the valueadded of a personnel selection system is realized from the performance of each individual selected using that personnel selection, the value-added of a strategic intervention would result from the incremental increase in performance of each individual SBU in which the strategic intervention was applied.
However, in contrast to most HRM applications, strategic decision makers will also be interested in point estimates of $ , or the forecasted dollar outcome of some strategic intervention X (or array of strategic interventions X 1 . . . X k ). In other words, while HRM professionals will not be particularly interested in a point estimate of the expected performance for any individual applicant, CEOs and other strategic decision makers will be very interested in both dollar impact point estimates ( $ ) and prediction intervals around those point estimates for strategic interventions in their firms. L. Kevin Cox, V.P. of Human Resources at American Express, will have little interest in the forecasted performance of any one newly hired call center employee ( $ obtained after applicant i"s standardized test score Z i is plugged into Equation 7).
In contrast, Kenneth I. Chenault, American Express" chairman and CEO, will have great interest in both the point estimate profit forecast and its associated prediction interval for the various alternate strategic interventions he might be considering. to change in effects of multicolinearity between the 32 and 19 predictor models (e.g., the coefficient for industry profitability ranged from -20.74 for Model 7 to -6.49 for main effect
Model 2).
Concern II: Causal Language and Nudity among Strategy Scholars
My second concern stems from the extensive use of "causal language" in the absence of experimental or quasi-experimental designs in the strategic management literature. George Specifically, it is highly unlikely that George"s (2005) Model 7 actually explains 75% of the dollar utility available to be explained in privately held firm profits. We are all familiar with the robust beauty and power of statistically optimized prediction equations. 7 Cross-validation is one way to account for the fact that actual predictive power will be attenuated by BOTH sampling error in Geroge"s (2005) N = 900 sample and sampling error in whatever collection of SBU"s one might apply George"s findings to. Efron and Tibshirani (1997) proved that the .632 bootstrap method of cross-validation is the most efficient means of estimating cross-validities, while Dean and Russell (2001) demonstrated how it could be applied in management research.
7 Dawes and Corrigan (1974) demonstrated in a Monte Carlo simulation that when X→Y relationships are monotonic, simple additive models chosen at random predict on average 92% of the variance in Y that would have been explained IF one had used the actual nonlinear model that originally generated the data. Given the paucity of non-monotonic relationships (i.e., U or inverted-U shaped relationships) in management research, this is yet another source of R inflation for incorrect models.
Applied to George"s (2005) analyses, the .632 bootstrap cross-validity estimation procedure would have (for example) generated 1000 samples of 900 firms with replacement from George"s original sample of 900, estimated each of the models in each of the 1000 bootstrap samples, then cross-validated each model on the approximately 331 (331.2 = 900 -.632{900}) firms that had not been included in each bootstrap sample. George"s (2005) estimates of model coefficients reported in his Table 2 possible by obtaining a sample of 58 companies (Woodward, 1965) . If I dwell on it too long, I
recall Karl Weick"s chapter titled "Laboratory experiments with organizations" (Weick, 1965) and revisit all over again my ~ 1978 career choice to "go micro" because macro-organizational research was just too hard to do! ) will always be larger than $1.5M and the remaining portion of the effect gets exponentially more negative as Resource Demand increases, lower resource demand should always yield greater profit. ), a statistic that is not linearly related to the "usefulness" of the underlying theory or model. A simple reporting and interpretive change focusing on r xy and − 1 2 … will resolve this problem. Additional focus on generating models that might actually be used by strategic decision makers (e.g., the slimmed down 19 predictor version of George"s, 2005 , Model 7) and cross-validation will yield improved estimates of a model"s actual usefulness and, for inverted Lewinians like myself, quality. Second, strong causal language is not justified in virtually every piece of strategy scholarship I read. More proactive involvement in real organizational settings, or "quasi-experimental field studies," is needed before strong causal inferences are justified. More applied field research is needed to move strategy beyond its current state of development. 
